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This book is a re-issue (entirely unamended,
apart from a new three-page preface) of a
volume that first appeared in 1989.  When it
was first published, the book was greeted as
a  pioneering  attempt  to  offer  a  fresh
explanation of British naval policy, one that
took  as  its  central  theme  the  influence  of
financial  and,  more  especially,  of
technological  developments  on  the
unfolding  of  new  policy  directions.   The
particular peg on which the author hung his
analysis was the British Admiralty’s interest
in,  and  ultimate  rejection  of,  a  new  fire
control  system  invented  and  developed
privately  by  Arthur  Hungerford  Pollen.
According  to  the  author,  the  promised
capabilities  of  the  Pollen  system played  a
major role in the introduction of new capital
ship types, especially the battle cruiser, and
on all  the policies  – tactical,  strategic  and
financial  –  that  flowed  from  such  design
and procurement decisions.   Similarly,  the
rejection  of  this  system  in  favour  of  an
allegedly  inferior  but  cheaper  rival,  the
Dreyer Table, condemned the Royal Navy,
or  so  it  is  argued,  to  failure  in  the  key
surface fleet action of the First World War,
the battle of Jutland.
There is no denying the originality
of the thesis, which has in the past exercised
enormous influence, despite the narrowness
of the core topic that informs the argument
–one,  ultimately  rejected,  fire  control
system.   Unfortunately,  while  some books
are  destined  to  remain  classics  –  for
example,  Arthur  Marder’s  From  the
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow,  which is still
the bedrock of the discipline more than half
a century after publication – this book has
not aged all  that  well.   When it  was first
released,  the  author  benefitted  from  an
almost  total  absence  of  other  scholars
working on, or even equipped to comment
on, what was undoubtedly a very technical
area.   Thus,  if  doubts  existed  about
Sumida’s  analysis  or  the  broader
conclusions  he drew from it,  few had  the
inclination or ability to express them.  This
all changed, however, with the entry into the
field  of  John  Brooks,  who  combined
professional  expertise  in  engineering
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alongside his skills as a historian.  Brooks,
who examined many of the same issues as
Sumida,  but  from a wider angle  and on a
better-balanced  evidential  base,  drew very
different conclusions.  His forensic analysis,
while unfailingly polite and always willing
to  acknowledge  the  pioneering  role  that
Sumida  had  played,  could  not  but  fail  to
hint  that  a thesis  about the Pollen system,
written  largely to  vindicate  Sumida’s  hero
Pollen, analyzing events from the point  of
view of  Pollen,  drawing heavily upon the
Pollen papers and enjoying the support  of
the Pollen family, might lack objectivity and
be  drawn,  as  a  result  of  its  partiality,  to
conclusions that  would look suspect  when
seen  from  a  broader  perspective.  By
contrast,  Brooks’ more  judicious  analysis,
drawing extensively on records that Sumida
had marginalized,  and using a  wider lens,
strongly  suggested  that,  if  consideration
were given to  the Admiralty’s  agenda,  the
rejection of the Pollen system was not the
travesty  that  Pollen  believed  and  Sumida
endorsed, but an entirely logical one, given
that the Dreyer Table better suited the Royal
Navy’s  proclaimed  tactical  requirements.
This  conclusion,  being  totally  at  variance
with  Sumida’s  core  position,  inevitably
shone a critical light on some of Sumida’s
other judgements, which now appeared out
of place and inconsistent with the evidence.
In  particular,  the  argument  that  Fisher’s
revolutionary  advances  in  warship  design
had been driven by a belief that the Royal
Navy would, courtesy of Pollen, soon have
a  monopoly  of  instruments  that  would
enable  them  alone  to  practice  long  range
gunnery  looked  especially  suspect,  all  the
more so as no evidence was presented that
Fisher knew about the Pollen system at the
time  he  conceived  his  new  warship
programme.
Since  Brooks  opened  Sumida’s
ideas up to scrutiny, several other aspects of
this book have been shown to be wanting.
In most cases, this is because the arguments
advanced  run  ahead  of  the  documentary
evidence presented.  The hypothesis that the
battle  cruiser  was  designed  to  counter
French and Russian armoured cruisers is a
case in point.  Mountains of evidence that
the  Naval  Intelligence  Department  was
unimpressed  by  the  capabilities  of  these
foreign vessels and did not believe that the
French and Russian programmes would be
completed as planned get no mention.  What
is  presented  instead  is  an  argument  based
upon extrapolation.  Fisher, as C-in-C of the
Mediterranean  Fleet  before  1902,  was
worried  about  these  vessels;  therefore,  he
must have been similarly worried by them
in  1904-5.   The  fact  that  there  are  no
documents presented to sustain this link and
that Russia’s armoured cruisers had been all
but annihilated before a single British battle
cruiser had been laid down is not allowed to
stand  in  the  way  of  the  hypothesis.   As
Sumida  and  others  have  subsequently
asserted on the authority of  this  book, the
agenda  behind  Fisher’s  reforms  was
preparing  the  Royal  Navy  for  a  global
cruiser war.  The fact that this book actually
offers scant proof for the assertion needs to
be stressed.
All in all, the reissue of this book is
to be welcomed as the financial data in the
appendices  remains  useful.   The  re-issue
will also enable those who wish to do so to
review the state of the historiography as it
existed  in  the  late  1980s.   Given  that  no
effort  has  been  made  to  incorporate
subsequent  scholarship  in  this  re-issue,
however, anyone who wishes to read an up-
to-date analysis of the fire control question
is  advised  to  refer  to  John  Brooks’
Dreadnought  Gunnery  and  the  Battle  of
Jutland:  The  Question  of  Fire  Control
(London: Routledge 2005).
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